THE WAR AGAINST ISLAM AND THE MUSLIMS AT HOME: THE MUDEJAR PREDICAMENT IN THE KINGDOM OF VALENCIA DURING THE REIGN OF FERNANDO «EL CATÓLICO»

Por
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Fernando's internal policy of fostering the communities of Muslims, or Mudejars, in the territories of his own Crown of Aragon seems at odds with a foreign policy which involved crusades against the Islamic states of Granada and the Maghrib, and encounters with the Ottoman Turks further east. This contradiction can be explained partly by the union of two Crowns with somewhat divergent interests. Whereas Isabel's Castile supplied the impetus and the majority of the manpower for the crusades, still vital in Aragon were the habits of Mediterranean frontier life, which admitted the necessity of minority enclaves and impelled Catalan and Valencian toward the Maghrib and Granada for commerce (1). Nevertheless, as he engaged in a protracted struggle with Islam, Fernando was not blind to the potential Muslim menace at home, particularly in the kingdom of Valencia, where the Mudejars comprised roughly thirty per cent of the population. There, the history of Mudejar rebellion and ambivalent loyalty to the Crown afforded the king little cause for comfort (2). Moreover, earlier anti-Muslim violence on the part of Christians suspicious of Mudejar intentions suggested a possible threat to the public order (3). As recent as 1455, the morería of the city of Valen-

(1) Discussions of Fernando’s foreign policy have not given enough attention to his internal policy as an indication of his motives and priorities. The view that Fernando was motivated solely by a desire to crusade against Islam, presented by JOSE M. DOUSSINAGUE, La política internacional de Fernando el Católico (Madrid, 1944), does not jibe with Fernando’s consistent encouragement of Mudejarism in the lands of the crown of Aragon. J. N. HILLGARTH, The Spanish Kingdoms, v. II (Oxford, 1978), pp. 534-584, presents a more balanced view of Fernando’s Mediterranean policy, in which confrontation with Islamic powers and the furthering of Aragon’s Mediterranean interests often coincide.


cia had been assaulted by mobs distressed by severe economic hardship and fearful of a rumored Nasrid offensive with an attendant Mudejar rising (4).

In this paper we will discuss how conflicts with specific Muslim foes affected Fernando’s perception of and policy toward his Muslim subjects in the kingdom of Valencia, and how the Mudejars themselves responded to the intensification of the perennial confrontation between Christianity and Islam.

Of the Islamic powers which Fernando had to face, the expanding empire of the Ottoman Turks posed the greatest threat. The danger peaked in August, 1480, when the forces of Mehmet the Conqueror captured Otranto on the Italian mainland, possibly as a prelude to the conquest of Sicily, an Aragonese possession, and of Rome itself. The crisis passed when the death of Mehmet compelled a Turkish withdrawal from Otranto in September, 1481.

During these critical months, Spain’s ascendancy over Islam in the west suddenly seemed precarious. Turkish advances rendered the sultanate of Granada more formidable and the allegiance of Fernando’s Muslim subjects more uncertain. Fernando was anxious about the possibility of a Mudejar reaction in Valencia to Ottoman successes. In December, 1480, he reminded his officials of the Turks’ entry into Italy and then, noting Valencia’s proximity to Granada, fretted over the fact that his kingdom had such a large number of Muslim inhabitants who were well armed and had access to its castles. Having had to postpone the crusade against Granada to counter the Turkish menace, Fernando determined at least to neutralize the Mudejars, lest they should «...make some effort in our disservice and of our Lord God and in damage of that kingdom». He ordered that all Muslims in the kingdom be disarmed and denied access to or custodianship of castles, so that «...we may be without any fear of the said Moors (5)».

However, Fernando added that his officials should act as they deemed best, with out causing any «...inconvenience or scandal (6)». In effect, this meant that they could do very little. Although arms control could be exercised in royal cities and towns (7), seigneurial opposition made it unfeasible in the baronies where the majority of Muslims resided (8). Indeed, documents from 1487 and 1502 describe the Mudejars as still armed to the teeth (9). Lacking evidence of Mudejar activity suggesting insurrec-

(4) GUAI, «Mudejares», pp. 472-494, gives an account of the attack and notes that, a few days after, the cry «moros vanen!» sent armed men scrambling to the city’s walls. JOSÉ HINOJOSA MONTALVO, «Las relaciones entre los reinos de Valencia y Granada durante la primera mitad del siglo XV», in Estudios de Historia de Valencia (Valencia, 1978), pp. 101-103, sees the assault on Valencia’s morería in 1455 as resulting from the fear of a rumored Nasrid offensive, and notes that the jurats of Valencia described the Mudejares as «nuestros enemigos publicos».

(5) ACÁ: C 3605: 87r (13 December, 1480): «...no ignorn lo entrada del Turch en la Italia per la qual cosa ab diligence e gran sollicitud se delve...n entendre en fer los provisions deguda per forma que en nostres regnes e terres per negligencia e no cura se seguirin algun inconvenient e porque vosaltres no ignorn aqüest nostre Regne de Valencia quanta vicinitat te al Granada y quant gran nombre de moros hi habelen los quals segons aqüest informa tienen moltes armes e tenen entrada y participi en algunes castells e fortalezas. E poiai idevar que ab aqüestes novitats del Turch fessen qualque assaig en deservir de nostre Senyor Deu e nostre e dan de aqueix Regne. Per co... havem deliberat que vosaltres pensen per quina via milor o pus tanta e comoda manera convenient o scandal algun se poran levar totes les armes als moros habitants en aqueix Regne axi en ciutats viles e locha nostres com de barons e de ecclesiastics. E que sia prohibit als dits moros entrar en fortalezas... E si alguns moros teñen alcaydies de algunes castells que sia provehui que aquells los sien llevados per forma que sense receb algun dels dits moros puxam star...».

(6) ACÁ: C 3605: 87r.

(7) ARV: B 1156: 874r-v (12 October, 1480), and ARV: B 1157: 265v-266r (27 June, 1482), are examples of licenses for bearing arms granted to Muslims. ARV: B 1160: 270r (16 August, 1491): the justice of Onda confiscates Muslim’s arms.

(8) AMV: g 7: 29: 247v-248r (15 February, 1481). While informing Fernando of their own concern about the Mudejars’ intentions in the wake of Turkish successes, the jurats of Valencia noted that the seigneurs would prefer to maintain the status quo instead of taking action against the Mudejars: «E falta que los qui tenen heretats pobliades de moros volien ques levan a beneficio de natura empero axi per... beneficio del dit Regne de Valencia es miyor provehi perquè lo dit vostre Regne sia preservat de irreparable ruyna».

(9) ACÁ: C 3685: 72r (23 April, 1487): «...cascun moro segons se diu en sa casa armes sobrades moltes mes de les que cascu dels ha mester». ARV: C 650: 242r-243v (12 April, 1502).
tion, royal officials kept only a cautious eye on the Moors without unnecessarily upset-
ting them by the application of a firm hand.

The Turks continued to preoccupy Fernando throughout the 1480s, and, so long
as Islam was politically alive in Granada, the Mudejars remained a related, though
by no means constant, concern. In 1487 Fernando received disturbing information
that the Mudejars had dispatched two envoys to «the Turk», Bayezit II, to inform him
of Spain’s war against Granada and to request support for the Nasrids before all was
lost. The envoys had suggested that Bayezit send his soldiers to Valencia, and there,
as in the other Spanish kingdoms, 200,000 Muslims would rise up in their favor and
bring about the «...damage and destruction of the Christians». The king’s reaction
was restrained. He ordered only a discreet investigation of the rumors. There survive
neither responses to Fernando’s queries nor record of the punishment of Mudejar sub-
versives (10).

The rumors seem ridiculous. Certainly, with his hands full in the east and in Egypt,
Bayezit was not in any position to mount an invasion of Spain and thereby lend sub-
stance to Mudejar plans. Nevertheless, this does not exonerate the Mudejars of the
intention of rebellion under propitious circumstances. It is very much within the realm
of possibility that Mudejar-Ottoman contact had, in fact, been established.

By 1487 Nasrid poetic appeals for assistance reached both Ottoman and Mam-
luk courts. Bayezit responded by sending the privateer Kemal Reís to the western Medi-
terranean on a reconnaissance mission. Reís based himself as a corsair in Bougie and
Bône and is thought to have made contact with Granadan Muslims somewhere along
Spain’s southeastern coast. The close ties between Valencia and Granadan Mus-
lims, the great concern for Granada expressed in the Mudejars’ alleged embassy, and
the embassy’s temporal conjunction with the Nasrid appeal lead to the conjecture
that Mudejar envoys in the company of Granadan counterparts met not with Bayezit,
but with Kemal Reís on either the Andalusian or the Maghriban coast (11). The Mudejars
were certainly in touch with Ottoman corsairs by 1502 (12). Earlier contacts, while
there was still some hope for the Nasrids, do not seem improbable. In any case, once
Granada was conquered, the threat of an Ottoman invasion in relief of the Nasrids
was removed, and with it the possibility of a large-scale Mudejar insurrection.

The initial years of Fernando’s reign saw a continuation of Valencia’s trade with
Granada and the Maghrib, in which Mudejar merchants played an important role (13).

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(10) ACA: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487): «E que avx matex havrien (the Muslim ajamas of the kingdom) elets e diputats dos
moros per missatgers la hu de la moreria de Xativa el altre de la de Patera apellat Pacoret e aquells havien tresmesos
al Thurch per notificar li la guerra que por nos se fa al dit rey de Granada e la perdicio en que aquell ere si per lo dit Thurch
no fos subvengut e ajudat, la qual ajuda havia esser trememte ses gens en nostres regnes e signantment en lo dit regne
de Valencia en lo qual o en los altres li notificaven trobava dents mila combatents moros que de continent se lavrian
en su ajuda e favor contra les crestinens en desreue nostre e dan e derruccion dels crestinens... vos... manam... que...
reben veridica informacio redigida en escrits de totes les damunt dites coses., e aquella closa segell orda e fe fahent
nos trametan perqué vista puixam provenir sobre les dites coses degudament miganpant justicia en castich e punitio
de les dits moros e morerias juxta los crims excessos e delicies que contra aquells e aquelles legitimament se provaran».

(11) RACHEL ARIÉ, L’Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides (1232-1492) (Paris, 1973), pp. 172-174, discusses the
Nasrid embassy to the Mamluk court; and ANDREW C. HEss, The Forgotten Frontier (Chicago, 1978), pp. 60-61, 228,
treats the mission of Kemal Reis in response to the Nasrid appeal. On a later and more serious manifestation of the con-
nection between Spanish Muslims and the Ottomans, see ANDREW HEss, «The Moriscos. An Ottoman Fifth Column

(12) See below, note 53.

(13) HINOJOSA, «Relaciones», pp. 111-128, treats Valencia’s commerce with Granada and Mudejar participation. For Fer-
nando’s reign, ARV: C 707: 789r-790r (17 May, 1479), and 889v-890r (30 June, 1481), are examples of licenses grant-
ted to Mudejars for travel to Almería for reasons of commerce. ARV: B 115v: 327r-v (23 October, 1481), and AMV:
g³ 29: 179r-180r (9 December, 1479), are examples of correspondence between Valencian and Granadan officials con-
cerning the activities of Valencian merchants in Almería. JACQUELINE GUIRAL, «Les relations commerciales du royaume
de Valence avec la Berbérie au XV siècle», Mélanges de la Casa de Valdésquez, 10 (1924), pp. 99-131. ARV: C 707:
791v-793r (19 January, 1480), and 912r-v (24 November, 1484), are examples of licenses granted to Mudejars for
tavel to the Maghrib on commercial business.
There also persisted the accustomed nuisance of Mudejar collusion with the Granadan «almugavers» and Maghriban corsairs who raided the kingdom in quest of booty and captives (14). In 1481, and again in 1483, Fernando deplored the fact that «almugavers» were secretly entering Valencia from Granada and perpetrating many crimes against the persons and property of Christians travelling on the kingdom's roads. The raiders were making themselves inconspicuous by mixing in the Mudejar morerías. As a remedy, the king ordered that all Muslims travelling by unaccustomed routes were to be seized and brought before the bailiff general for judgement. The measure had some success. A few Mudejars were arrested for the crime of «collera» — the kidnapping of Christians for sale as slaves in Islamic countries (16) —, «almugavers» were captured (17), and Muslims travelling on prohibited backroads were apprehended (18). The depredations of the «almugavers» and their Mudejar colleagues ceased after 1483, when the escalation of the war against Granada forced the Nasrids into a defensive posture (19).

Mudejar travel to the Maghrib for purpose of trade and visiting kinfolk (20), and the presence in Valencia of Maghriban merchants (21) and Maghriban and Granadan of the war against Granada forced the Nasrids into a defensive posture (19).


15. ARV: B 1157: 119r-120r (15 September, 1481): «...considerat que de tots dies cometen molts e diversos dans per los camins del regne de Valencia en les persones bons e mercaderies dels cretians vassalli e subdits nostres e altres passatgers... los quals son feta e perpetrats per alguns infieles e moros qui entren occultament e amagada de les parts e terres de Granada en lo dit nostre regne de Valencia en lo qual per les grans morenes quay sem augmenten de numero de gent però fer majors danes... en datimient... e evident dan de nostres subdits e vassallis cretians com los moros vagen segurs per lo dit regne sens esser los fet dan algu... ordenam ab la present provisio real... que tota hora e quant per qualsevol personas... seran presos qus avol moros e les robis diners joyes entant passant extint e tornant sen per lo dit nostre regne de nits o de dia per vies insolites e camins no acostumats que les persones e bens dels ditos moros... sien portats davant lo nostre batle general... e que aquell sia tengu judicar aquell tal moro o moros, que si algu o alguns adelils seran presos en la dita companya de moros que aquell o aquells sien donats... a nos e a nostres oficials perque... justitia... sia administrada a castich de aquells o a exemple de les males gent...». ACA: C 3633: 117r-v (10 February, 1483), is a reiteration of the above provision. Probably in relation to this problem was the royal proclamation made in 1481 that all Muslims and Jews must wear symbols distinguishing them from Christians. ARV: MR 92: 321r. In ACA: C 3655: 20v-21r (5 December, 1486), Fernando explicitly cites the Mudejars’ failure to wear symbols as being a factor which enables them, incognito, to assault and kidnap Christians: «... se sagnue que per no anar senyals los ditos moros ans vestits indiferentment com a cretians... e sens barbes ni toques ni altre senyals de moros se fan de totes dies de moltes insulti o desordens catalvint cretians e aquells injuriant e maltractant e jahent ab cretians...». However, by 1486, Christian captives, if they were, in fact, taken, probably would have been handed over to Maghribin rather than to Granadan Muslims.

16. ARV: C 126: 124r-v (3 March, 1480), and ARV: C 304: 71r-v (26 May, 1480), deal with cases of «collera», as does ARV: C 131: 90v-r (30 July, 1483): «Exposiciones per humilii prom parte Ali Jubbeue ville de Asp vassalli... Joannis Roiz de Corella Comitis de Cocentaya Maiestas nostre facta praeposimus quemadmodum ha jam elapsis diebus iose inculpata delitats et accusatus fuit per Petrum Martinez Berganti procuratorum fieri nostri de crimine intercipiendi et captivandi christians scilicet quod sarracenis qui ex sarracenorum térra videntur et dicitur Regno Granate in Regnum nostrum Valenti ut fieri solet venirent ut christianos captivos secum adducereat consilium auxilium ab favorem beati atque prestabat».

17. ACA: C 3605: 85v-86r (17 December, 1480), deals with the case of «almugavers» captured in the lands of the Infante Enrique, the Duke of Segorbe, although this was before Fernando’s measures took effect. ACA: C 3605: 118r (28 September, 1481). «almugavers» are captured in Murcia.

18. ARV: B 1157: 156r (7 January, 1482): Mudejar travelling on a prohibited route between Tibi and Cocentaina are apprehended.

19. This is suggested by the absence of evidence of further «almugaver» activity. ACA: C 3649: 150v-151v (6 April, 1492), shows how well the kingdom’s roads were controlled. Murcian Muslims could enter the kingdom only through the city of Orihuela. Thus, once the war had ended, the lord of the Valle de Ricote in Murcia asked that these travel restrictions be lifted.

20. See note 13. ARV: C 707 also contains numerous examples of Mudejars travelling to the Maghrib on family business, such as 796v-797r (12 January, 1480), a license to Azmet Gallinayre of Oliva to travel to Tunis «per recaptar una herencia»; or 914r-v (26 November, 1484), a license to Muhammad Perpir of Valencia to go to Tunis «per veure hun jarna de aquell que te en la dita ciutat e per haver una herencia».

21. Guiral, «Relaciones comerciales», pp. 107-111. However, Guiral’s article needs some correction. Her graph and tables, pp. 123-124, 131, suggest that there were not any Maghriban merchants in Valencia between 1493 and 1502, when, in fact, the registers ARV: B 1160 (e.g., 915v-916r), B 1161 (e.g., 15v-16r), and B 1162 (e.g., 123v-124r) contain safe-conducts permitting one year of residence in the kingdom of Maghribin and Granadan.
captives, some of whom, once ransomed, remained in Valencia (22), provided Maghriban corsairs with a potential network of spies and guides who could facilitate their infiltration of Valencian territory. Although Mudejar insurgence of this sort was by no means widespread, it was sufficiently vexatious to prompt the bailiff general to prohibit the ownership of fishing boats by Mudejars, so that they could not, under pretense of fishing, lead corsair galleys to Valencia's shores (23). Indeed, a Mudejar of Cocentaina was captured in the company of 100 raiders from Oran (24). Even more striking was the information that a Muslim from Oliva was piloting a corsair fleet (25).

The absence of energetic royal action to curb such Mudejar activity can in part be explained with one of the arguments of Valencia's nobles against the conversion of the Mudejars in 1502. They maintained that Mudejars often advised Christians of the coming of corsairs (26). In 1503, while requesting that their Muslim vassals who had fled to the Maghrib be allowed to return to Valencia, certain lords emphasized that while their vassals were in Africa they did not capture Christians, rather they picked up information regarding «...the damage that the Moors from beyond would like to do» (27). Fernando, impressed, complied. Thus, the intelligence network between Muslims of opposite Mediterranean shores could work both ways, sometimes to the kingdom's benefit.

The exigencies of the decade-long crusade against Granada did not drastically alter Fernando's Mudejar policy. Strategies were not adapted for the eventuality of a Mudejar rising in Granada's favor, nor were preventive measures taken beyond the investigation of rumors. The Mudejars were not significantly disturbed in their local economic and social pursuits. The only restrictions imposed were those limiting Mudejar travel to the regions of the kingdom closest to Granada and the passage of Muslims between Valencia and the Maghrib. So as not to curb Mudejar commercial activity any more than was absolutely necessary, the restrictions were relaxed in 1491, when victory seemed at hand (28). The probable opposition of the nobility, capable of con-

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(22) Vicenta Cortes, La esclavitud en Valencia durante el reinado de los Reyes Católicos (1479-1516) Valencia, 19641, is a useful, though by no means exhaustive, treatment of the problem; and Guiral, «Relacions comercials», pp. 114-116, 126-129. Also, see below, note 38.
(23) ARV: C 586: 147r-v (7 June, 1494): «En aquest vostre Regne de Valencia de alguns anys en ca se son seguits grans inconvenients a causa que los moros que stan en los viles e lochs maritims de aquest vostre Regne de Valencia tenen arcs e barques de peixcar... e sots color de exercir la dita art de peixcar son receptats en aquest Regne per aquells moros strans ab fustes pera cativar los crestians...»
(24) ARV: C 311: 254r-255r (6 June, 1502): «...vos diem tacan del moro de Cocentayna que fonch pres en la dita cavalcade qui diu tenen en la presa en cas que per justltia no haja a esser condemnad a mort per esser de la terra e trobarse ab los enemichs...» ARV: B 195: 65r-v (30 April, 1502): «...vos diem tacan del moro de Cocentayna que fonch pres en la dita cavalcade qui diu tenen en la presa en cas que per justltia no haja a esser condemnad a mort per esser de la terra e trobarse ab los enemichs...»
(25) AMV: g3 33: 249r (2 April, 1501): «...in Ora an armat sis fustes...e que venen per pilot de Bablaguer moro de Oliva.»
(26) ARV: C550: 243r (12 April, 1502): «...fins ara en aquest regne en lo temps que los moros no tenien recel...de esser forçats...ferse cristians...quant fustes algunes de moros venien en aquest regne los moros del dit regne eren en avise dels cristians com es vist per speriencia moltes vegades.»
(27) ARV: B 1162: 429v-429r (1 April, 1503): «...nos ha seydo fecha relacion los dichos moros al tiempo que se fueron no se levaron cristianos algunos ante dende alla han dado algunos havises del danyo que los moros de eliende quieran fazer. E que voluntariament se quieren volver a vivir a esso Reyno como solian...»
(28) Leopoldo Piles, «La situación social de los moros de realengo en la Valencia del siglo XV,» Estudios de Historia Social de España, 1 (1949), p. 258, notes that it had been established by Alfonso V in 1418 that Muslims from areas north of the Jijona River could not travel south of the Jijona or to Castile without the permission of the bailiff general. The registers ARV: B 1156-1162, contain licenses for travel beyond the Jijona. The number of licenses granted during the years of my study are as follows:

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trolling their own Muslim vassals, and the size of the Muslim population dissuaded Fernando from an excessively repressive policy that might have provoked a rebellion more quickly than the war itself.

In general, Fernando was confident that Christian dominance in Valencia would circumscribe Mudejar disloyalty to the few who intrigued with «almugavers» and corsairs. Given the weakness of the Nasrids before the combined power of Castile and Aragon, he could afford to be somewhat lax. It is significant that he became wary of the Mudejars only with respect to the Turks, the one Islamic power with substantial offensive capabilities. The king’s confidence was well-founded, for not a Mudejar sword was unsheathed in defense of the beleaguered Nasrid sultanate.

Yet, it may be that the Mudejars were more willing to empty their purses in support of the Nasrids. In 1487 it was reported that they had been sending large annual subsidies to the sultan since 1481. The _fuqaha’_ (fuqaha’), who were responsible for collecting the funds, were also leading their congregations in a prayer that beseeched God to exalt the sultan and to destroy Fernando and his hosts. The king, exasperated, ordered investigation and, if necessary, punishment (29). Although the documents are otherwise silent on this matter, it seems reasonable that, in lieu of military activity, Valencia’s Muslim minority would have resorted to financial aid and prayer on behalf of that remnant of al-Andalus to which they were bound by religion and kinship (30). Indeed, their effort to make contact with the Turks on the Nasrids’ behalf, if true, is another indication of their deep attachment to the Granadan sultanate. Still, beyond the inaudible sinking of Muslim hearts, the fall of Granada had no further reverberations in Mudejar Valencia.

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The sharp increase in 1491 perhaps reflects a reaction to the relaxation of the previous stringency. The continuing high level in 1492 and 1493 can be attributed to post-war population shifts (Valencian Muslims retrieving relations for settlement in Valencia, ransomed slaves already residing in Valencia returning to Granada for personal business, and Valencia’s Muslims taking advantage of the opportunity to visit Granada), whereas the marked decrease after 1495 perhaps reflects a gradual cordoning off of the former sultanate as an aid to Talavera’s missionary efforts. The mere trickle from 1500 through 1502 was due to the revolts in the Alpujarras and the conversion of the Muslims of Granada, Murcia, and Castile.

Regarding the passage of Muslims between Valencia and the Maghrib, see note 21. Giral’s data, _Relaciones comerciales_, pp. 123-124, 131, is accurate for the years before 1493. ARV: C 707 shows that between 1484 and 1491 there were no licenses for travel to the Maghrib granted to Mudejars. There was a very slight resumption of Mudejar travel in 1491: six licenses were granted, though three were to Castilians and one to an Aragonese Mudejar. Unfortunately, there are no registers following ARV: C 707, which terminates in 1491. Given the fact that Maghribi merchants continued to come to Valencia throughout the 1490s, even during the years of the crusade against Africa, there is no reason why Mudejars should not have resumed their visits to the Maghrib, particularly when one considers that the majority of the Mudejars had been travelling to Tunis, with which city Fernando maintained consistent commercial relations.

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(29) ACA: C 3665: 20r-21r (5 December, 1488): Fernando mentions the report that the kingdom’s morerías were sending the the sultan an annual subsidy of the value of the skins of the animals they had killed. AOA: C 3665: 72r (23 April, 1487) gives more detail: «Com siam informats que les allames de moros de aquex nostre regne de Valencia axi de real-lench com altra axi allemament com singularment... deis anys en ca havien fets diversos soccosos e subvencions de moltes quantitats de peccunia en grants sumes al rey de Granada... diputant alfaquis e persones en cascuna allama a plegar e rebre de cascun moro les dites subvencions e rematant les dites quantitats cascun any al dit rey perque de aquells fos ajudat en sa defensio e contra aquesta sancta empresa... encara los dits moros e los alfaquis de dites morerías del dit temps de aquesta empresa en ca havien ordenada una carta oració e aquella fan de continuo en ses ores contenent en efecte que Deu exalte lo dit rey de Granada e que destruiesta a nos e a totes nostres gens ab altres leges paraules de blasfemia que offenen les oreilles.» See note 10 for Fernando’s order that these rumors be investigated.

(30) Hinojosa, _Relaciones_, p. 104, suggests that among Valencia’s Mudejars the Nasrid sultan exercised «... una cierta jefatura, teórica ai menos, en el campo espiritual, ...» emphasizing that in 1455 the sultan had expressed considerable anger to the jurats of Valencia over the attack on Valencia’s morería. One might also conjecture that Mudejars invoked the name of the reigning Nasrid in their Friday prayers. ARV: C 707, contains instances of Mudejars travelling to Almería on family business, such as Amet Biale of Castellnou, 786v-787r (12 May, 1479), or to study Arabic, such as Cahat Calip of Játiva, 820r-v (19 April, 1480).
Fernando’s post-war policy was an expression of his belief in the continuing viability of Mudejarism. Satisfied that Valencia had survived the shocks of the Granadan campaigns and the worst of the Ottoman threat without major incident, he encouraged the settlement of Granadan Muslims in a number of Valencian localities (31). Also, he permitted Muslim travel from Valencia to the new kingdom of Granada (32). Unfortunately, Fernando’s relatively “liberal” policy was to be thwarted by the extremism of Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros.

The Mudejars’ quiescence during the war years can be explained by their awareness of the realities of power which neither the distant progress of the Turks nor the desultory raids of corsairs could change. The growth of Christian population in Valencia—approximately seventy per cent of the total by the mid-fifteenth century—and the increasing solidification of the structures of Christian authority brought home to the Mudejars the futility of rebellion (33). Moreover, the debility of the states of western Islam offered them little prospect of succor in the event of their rising (34). Only the Turks raised a faint glimmer of hope, but that quickly faded. Finally, more than two centuries of life under Christian rule had inured them to their subject status. The conditions which had made the Mudejar bristle in the thirteenth century were accepted with greater equanimity in the fifteenth.

This is not to suggest that the Mudejars were insensitive to the plight of their fellows. On the contrary, they displayed considerable commitment and sense of responsibility for their Muslim brethren, but they did so in areas where they could be most effective. Rather than making war, they aided prisoners of war; and rather than vainly rebelling against their Christian lords, they acted on behalf of the victims of oppression. Mudejars helped Muslim prisoners break out of seigneurial jails (35); they spirited away from brothels Muslim women forced into a life of prostitution (36); and at times they violently resisted the efforts of royal officials to punish members of their communities (37). Most impressive was Mudejar assistance to slaves and captives, which seems to have been organized among the kingdom’s morerías. Runaways were hidden in the morerías and were given boats for escape to África. Captives were ransomed and then either sent home or welcomed as permanent community members (38). In this way the Mudejars met the claims made on them by membership in an...
international Islamic community without rashly incurring the wrath of a king whose power they could not hope to challenge.

Despite all that has been said about the possibility of Mudejar disloyalty, one must not assume that all or even most of Fernando’s Muslim subjects understood contemporary events in terms of Muslim-Christian confrontation, or that each one contemplated what might be done for the cause of Islam. Beneath all the crusading rhetoric lay the weighty determinant of self-interest. In a world where «realpolitik» was as important as ideology in the formation of alliances (39), where Granadan and Maghriban Muslims preferred to remain in Christian Valencia (40), and where Christians smuggled arms to Muslims and piloted their ships (41), it is no great wonder that most Mudejars were reluctant to risk physical security in Valencia in support of a divisive Maghrib or a declining Granada. Even within Valencia Muslims expended as much energy in internecine quarreling and family feuding as they did in cooperative defiance of Christian authority (42).

The rumblings of change and the origins of crisis for Valencia’s Mudejars issued neither from the crusades against Islam nor from within Valencian society itself, but from Granada and Castile where Isabel and Cardinal Cisneros were eliminating Mudejarism. Cisneros’ brand of conversion by coercion sparked Muslim revolts in the Albacín and in the Alpujarras through 1500 and 1501. Once the revolts were quelled Granada was completely «Christianized», and by February, 1502, Castile’s Mudejars were offered the choice of baptism or expulsion (43).

If Fernando thought that his own kingdoms could remain immune to this tragedy of conflict and conversion, he was grievously mistaken. Certain elements of Valencia’s Christian populace, who had abstained from anti-Mudejar violence despite the continual preaching of the crusade against Islam, began early in 1500 to murmur that Valencia’s Muslims ought to convert, either voluntarily or by compulsion (44). These

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rumor-mongers, approving of Cisneros’ methods and perhaps frightened that Muslim rebellion would spread to their kingdom, threatened to foment a wave of anti-Muslim violence. Fernando responded quickly and placed all the morerías of the kingdom under special royal safeguard. He declared the principle that «...our holy Catholic faith in the conversion of the infidels admits neither violence nor any force but complete freedom and devotion». Anyone daring to say the contrary or to inflict physical or verbal abuse on the Muslims was to be punished (45). The king had to issue the same order for Catalonia (46), and again for Valencia in 1502 (47).

In April, 1502, the nobles of Valencia informed Fernando that the Mudejars were gripped by two great fears: that they would be forced to convert or emigrate as were their coreligionists in Castile; and that the Inquisition was going to proceed against them for dissuading their fellows from baptism and for maintaining that Islam was a better religion (48). Having already admonished the Inquisitors, the nobles reminded Fernando that the Mudejars were the economic foundation of the kingdom without whom it would crumble. Already the distraught Muslims had stopped working and paying their rents. Instead, they were selling their property and hiding their goods in mountain caches. Those who had access to boats were leaving the kingdom (49).

Worse still, the Mudejars were being driven to the brink of violence. The nobles warned that there were more than 22,000 households of Muslims who were well armed, had an intelligence network, and lived near impregnable mountain fastnesses. An imprudent move on the king’s part could result in the deaths of Christians...
and Muslims and in the destruction of much property (50). Fernando had to convince the Muslims that Castilian Mudejars policy would not have a Valencian sequel.

The king’s initial response, an effort to freeze Mudejar movement, only caused more panic, since the Muslims saw this as a preliminary to their conversion (51). The untimely decision of Fernando’s lieutenant to conduct an inquiry into the Mudejars’ abetting of runaway slaves had a similar effect. Muslims continued to flock to Valencia’s shores for escape (52).

During these panic-filled months of 1502 there came to the fore the Mudejars’ contacts with Maghriban corsairs and their Ottoman allies (53). Muslim piratical activity noticeably increased in 1502 and 1503, as did the size and daring of their raiding parties (54). This was linked to peninsular events, since embittered Granadan Muslims had been filling the corsairs’ ranks (55). It is clear that when corsairs set sail to plunder and terrorize Valencia’s coasts they also had in mind assisting the kingdom’s Muslims. Guided by Mudejar intelligence, the galleys arrived and picked up the Mudejars waiting on the shore (56).

It is significant that in this desperate situation the Mudejars chose flight instead of armed rebellion. On the one hand, it reflects the Mudejars’ sense of impotence before Christian power in Valencia. On the other hand, the willingness to abandon
their homes and possessions shows that for the Mudejars the freedom to practice Islam outweighed all other considerations. When forced to convert in 1525, a number of Mudejars would resort to armed resistance (57). When, in 1503, Fernando restored calm and assured all parties in the Corts of Barcelona that Islam would continue to be sanctioned by royal authority, a number of Mudejars returned home from the Maghrib (58). As long as they could practice Islam, Valencia’s Muslims preferred to do so in Valencia.

In conclusion, the international clash between Christianity and Islam did not have in Valencia an impact sufficient to unravel the resilient fabric of Muslim-Christian «convivencia». The Mudejars did not express their identification with Islam by rebelling against their crusading king; nor did that king harshly oppress his Muslim subjects while warring with Islamic states. The occasional Mudejar collusion with Muslim enemies was borne as a customary feature of frontier life, an insignificant annoyance in comparison with the economic benefits accruing from the Mudejar presence. A key factor in explaining why Valencia’s Christians and Muslims did not rise up in violence against each other in response to the promotion of crusade is that for them Christian-Muslim conflict, on either the local or the international scale, was not anything new. Ever-present in the social formula of «convivencia» itself was the element of ideological antagonism, which was either mitigated or aggravated by economic and social factors. Indeed, economic and social distress, the result of forces external to the fundamental religious difference, was usually most responsible for the eruption of violence (59). More novel than war with Islam was the harnessing of Aragón to the Castilian juggernaut, which, while it allowed for the final conquest of Granada, also unleashed forces within Valencia that threatened its tradition of Mudejarism. Although the union of the two Crowns set the stage for Spain’s imperial achievements, it redirected the destinies of its constituent societies in sometimes tragic ways.

ABBREVIATIONS

| ACA | Archivo de la Corona de Aragón |
| ARV | Archivo del Reino de Valencia |
| AMV | Archivo Municipal de Valencia |
| C  | Real Cancillería |
| B  | Bailía General |
| MR | Maestre Racional |
| g³ | Lletres Missives |

(57) Ricardo García Cárcel, «La revuelta morisca de Espadan,» Al-Andalus (1976), 121-146.
(58) See, for example, note 27.
(59) The importance of economic and social factors in the generation of anti-Muslim violence can be seen in the attack on the morería of Valencia in 1455 which occurred during a time of plague, drought, and rising prices, and had as its leaders the urban unemployed and lower classes — and in the anti-Mudejar action of the Germanias in 1521 — which had as its prime victims the wealthier Mudejars of the irrigated huertas and occurred only after the Mudejars had fought in seigneurial armies against the Germanias. On 1455, see Hinojosa, «Relaciones,» p. 103; Gual, «Mudejares,» pp. 472-484. Leopoldo Piles Ros, Apuntes para la historia económico-social de Valencia durante el siglo XV (Valencia, 1989), pp. 115-119, and Ricardo García Cárcel and E. Ciscar Pallarés, Moriscos i agermanats (Valencia, 1974), p. 30. On the Germanias, see Ricardo García Cárcel, Las Germanias de Valencia (Barcelona, 1981), pp. 186-191, and García and Ciscar, op. cit., pp. 121-130.
(*) The writer gratefully acknowledges the Comité Conjunto Hispano-Norteamericano for its funding of this project on Muslims and Mudejars in Eastern Spain.