

GALDÓS IN CONTEXT: THE REPUBLICAN YEARS, 1907-1914

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For Rudi

In the only more than passing account of Galdós's Republicanism and later return to the monarchical fold, H. C. Berkowitz explains Galdós's political career in terms of moral and psychological shortcomings—his susceptibility to flattery, naïveté, approaching senility (383-408).¹ However, when placed in contemporary political context, Galdós's behavior suggests a coherent and intellectually defensible response to the rapidly shifting political situation between 1907 and 1914.

My purpose in the present essay is not to offer a comprehensive account of Galdós's political activities² or of the history of the period but rather, by providing a context for Galdós's Republicanism and subsequent evolution toward the monarchy, to correct Berkowitz's simplistic, even hostile, interpretation.³ Most Spanish Republican parties were as much part of Spain's liberal tradition as the Conservative and Liberal monarchist parties that alternated in power.⁴ In early 1907, at a time when the Liberal party had split into warring bands and Maura was entrenched in power, Galdós found in Republicans an enthusiastic audience for his anticlerical views. Far from being a pawn of others, Galdós played a prominent and independent role in Republican leadership, energetically campaigning against the *ley del terrorismo* in 1908 and heading the Executive Committee of the *Conjunción republicano-socialista* (1909-13). His rapprochement with the monarchy was not an isolated, personal gesture. In 1913, the *partido reformista*, whose leader, Melquíades Álvarez, admired the British form of constitutional monarchy, «evolved» toward acceptance of the monarchy. Prominent Republicans, including Galdós, were cordially received by Alfonso; in the political crisis of 1913, Melquíades Álvarez declared his willingness to collaborate with the monarchy; as a consequence, the *reformistas*, with Galdós, were expelled from the *Conjunción*. Although the *partido reformista* never achieved power, it attracted the support of numerous Spanish intellectuals. By lending his prestige to the new party, Galdós established an ideological link between the liberals of his generation, that of the Revolution of 1868, and the young thinkers of the twentieth century, such as Ortega y Gasset and Pérez de Ayala.

The Liberal Crisis and Spanish Republicanism, 1903-1907

In declaring himself a Republican in April 1907, Galdós abandoned a Liberal party in disarray. Since the turn of the century, the political settlement of the Restoration and Regency had collapsed, as both Conservative and

Liberal politicians proved reluctant or unable to deal with national problems: agrarian and industrial unrest, anarchist disorders, Catalan discontent, the unexpected and energetic intervention of the young Alfonso XIII in constitutional matters (the rumored renewal of the *obstáculos tradicionales*), and fears of a military coup.⁶ The Regenerationist movement had failed by late 1900, although its rhetoric remained a staple of political discourse for the next decade. Liberals channeled frustrated energies (and distracted attention from Liberal shortcomings) by pressing anticlerical measures. In 1906, two items of legislation divided the Liberal party. The Moret government's passage of the *ley de jurisdicciones* revealed the impotence of traditional liberal values. Later in the year, radical anticlerical legislation proposed by the López Domínguez government and supported by Canalejas was deemed too revolutionary by many Liberals.

Furthermore, both Liberal and Conservative parties were divided by the personal antagonisms of politicians jockeying to fill the voids left by the deaths of Cánovas (1897) and Sagasta (1903). The breakdown of party discipline, as well as Alfonso's willingness to change prime ministers (the *crisis orientales*), led to numerous ministerial changes: five Conservative ministries between December 1902 and June 1905, five Liberal ministries between June 1905 and January 1907. Only the deaths of his rivals—Silvela (1905), Villaverde (1905), and Romero Robledo (1906)—left Maura, himself a defector from the Liberals, in control of the Conservative party. The Liberals had been split since 1903, when Montero Ríos and Canalejas founded the short-lived *partido liberal democrático*. By late 1906, its leaders' quarrels had brought the Liberal party to the point of collapse. In November 1906, Moret, in the *crisis del papelito*, persuaded Alfonso to remove López Domínguez from power. Canalejas, Montero Ríos, and their partisans refused to support Moret, who resigned in favor of the aged Vega de Armijo, whose government Canalejas refused to support. By January 1907, the Liberals were totally rent by the mutual antipathies of Moret, Montero Ríos, and Canalejas. Behind the scenes, Romanones manipulated for his own advantage. Since no Liberal contender for prime minister could obtain the support of a majority of Liberal deputies, Alfonso called on the Conservative Maura to form a government at the end of January 1907. The Liberals failed to heal their divisions before the May elections. In March 1907, Canalejas formed the *partido democrático monárquico*, which would have nine seats in Maura's new *Cortes*.

Spanish Republicans, although numerous, were divided both by personalities and by ideology. The left wing (*blasquistas, federales*) favored a revolutionary path to a federal republic; the center (Lerroux) held that revolution should install a unitary republic; the right wing (Azcárate, Melquíades Álvarez) desired a unitary republic to be established by constitutional means (see Artola 387-95). There was no single Republican party; instead, often antagonistic groupings allied temporarily in electoral pacts with as common ideology only a sectarian anticlericalism and a platonic republicanism. In 1903, at the instigation of the anticlerical journalist José Nakens, the *Unión Republicana* was formed, under the presidency of Nicolás Salmerón, the only surviving ex-president of the Republic of 1873. The *Unión Republicana*, which included,

if only briefly, the Radical Republican Alejandro Lerroux, the Valencian federalists Blasco Ibáñez and Rodrigo Soriano, and Costa's followers from the *Unión Nacional*, possessed no common program—a feature that won the support of Esquerdo and the *progresistas*—and was little more than an electoral pact for the elections of April 1903, when thirty-four Republican deputies were returned to the *Cortes*, with Republican triumphs in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona.

Almost immediately, the *Unión Republicana* began to disintegrate. Within a month of its founding, the followers of Blasco Ibáñez and Soriano fought in the streets of Valencia, and Soriano was expelled from the *Unión Republicana*. In 1904, the moderate Republicans Melquíades Alvarez and Rafael María de Labra (a senator and one of the founders of the *Institución Libre de Enseñanza*) resigned; in 1905, Nakens denounced the autocratic and inactive leadership of Salmerón. In February 1906, in protest against the proposed *ley de jurisdicciones*, Salmerón joined *Solidaridad Catalana*, a grouping that included not only Catalanists but also Carlists. Salmerón's alliance with Carlists (to the scandal of non-Catalan Republicans, Salmerón publicly embraced the Carlist leader, the Duke of Solferino), his sabotaging of Lerroux's control of Barcelona, his authoritarian and senile leadership, destroyed the *Unión Republicana*. Blasco Ibáñez, Lerroux, Sol y Ortega, and the *progresistas* either resigned or were expelled. In the elections of May 1907, *Solidaridad Catalana* triumphed in Catalonia; both the Republican right wing (Sol y Ortega) and the Radicals (Lerroux) were eliminated in the region. Most non-Catalan Republicans disavowed the leadership of Salmerón, especially after he termed, in June 1907, Catalonia a *patria* in the *Cortes*. (Soriano, on the other hand—and the example is illustrative of shifting Republican loyalties—became reconciled with Salmerón and the regionalists in June 1907 in order to make common cause against Blasco Ibáñez and Lerroux.) Salmerón, who died in 1908, reaped no political advantage from his «betrayal» of Republican principles. The *Lliga*, under Cambó, soon reached an accord with Maura. The *Unión Republicana* was dissolved in June 1908.

Galdós and the Republican Movement, 1907-1908: The Anticlerical Years

Galdós's disappointment at the inability of the Liberal government to pass anticlerical legislation, rather than his innocence in the face of Republican flattery, was, I believe, the key factor in his conversion to Republicanism.⁷ Fernando Lozano (*Demófilo*), Luis Morote, and Rodrigo Soriano—the Republican emissaries who persuaded Galdós to become a Republican—were notorious anticlericals.⁸ The dominant note of Galdós's open letter of April 1907 to Alfredo Vicenti, the editor of the Republican newspaper *El Liberal*, is one of strident anticlericalism: his monarchical sentiments, he claimed, had died with the Liberal failure to enact a *Ley de asociaciones*; for the future, he demanded «absoluta libertad de conciencia,» «la enseñanza luminosa, con base científica,» and a ceaseless struggle against «la barbarie clerical.»⁹

Galdós adhered to no single Republican party or grouping. In his letter to Vicenti, he reserved his independence of action;¹⁰ also, negotiating from a

position of strength, he insisted that Alfredo Vicenti and Roberto Castrovido be his fellow candidates in the coming election. Elected to the *Cortes* in May 1907, his political stance was initially one of intransigence; thus, in April 1908 he joined Soriano and a small group of Republican deputies in advocating, in opposition to Azcárate, continued obstruction of the debate on the *Ley de administración local* (Soldevilla, 1908). His first major political role was in the successful campaign of 1908 against Maura's proposed *Ley del terrorismo*.¹¹ Scarcely dealing with the proposed legislation, Galdós's speeches in the campaign were strongly anticlerical. In Barcelona (June 15), he attacked fanaticism, superstition, the role of the Church in education and morality, and the imposition by the Vatican of «leyes inquisitoriales, como ésta del terrorismo»; he praised Charles III and the Conde de Aranda for having opposed «la teocracia intrusa» (Madariaga 321-22).¹² One week later, in San Sebastián (June 21), Galdós protested the invasion of friars and attributed Spanish pessimism in part to clerical rule (Madariaga 219-20). In November, Moret in Zaragoza proposed an ambitious program for the formation of a *bloque de las izquierdas*.¹³ Galdós, after some hesitation, in Santander (November 29) hailed the *bloque* as necessary to save society from the «horroroso diluvio reaccionario y clerical»:

No desmayaremos mientras no sea extirpado el miedo religioso, funestísima plaga creada y difundida por la teocracia como instrumento de dominación, moviendo los intereses frente a las conciencias y sujetando por tal medio a innumerables personas que si vivieran en franca libertad renegarían de las formas y prácticas de la beatería... Nuestros anhelos, nobles amigos, son de eliminar para siempre la acción teocrática de la esfera política, extinguir el miedo religioso, y alejar del suelo patrio a los poderes exóticos y nada espirituales que vienen a dirigir nuestra política, a embobar nuestras almas, para encarnarse en nuestros cuerpos y hacerse dueños de toda la vida española, y a trincar con dura guerra la Enseñanza pública, para moldear a su imagen las generaciones venideras. (Madariaga 223)

Galdós and the *Conjunción*, 1909-1911

The *bloque de las izquierdas* included monarchists (Moret, López Domínguez, Romanones, and Canalejas—the last two of whom were, according to García Venero, greatly disliked by Galdós)¹⁴ and Republicans (Morote, Vicenti, Sol y Ortega, Esquerdo, Azcárate, Melquíades Álvarez). It was opposed by doctrinaire Republicans (Lerroux, Nakens, Costa), who held that collaboration would strengthen the monarchy (Carr 482-83).

The *bloque* was strongly supported by the two leading Republican intellectuals: Gumersindo de Azcárate (1840-1917), a law professor at the Universidad Central, former rector of the Institución Libre de Enseñanza and founder of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (García Carraffa); and Melquíades Álvarez (1864-1936), the rising star of Republicanism. Melquíades Álvarez, a former protégé of Clarín, was a professor of law at the University of Oviedo, had been Republican deputy for Oviedo since 1901, and was, with Maura, the outstanding orator in the *Cortes* (Azorín 68, 253-56). An admirer of the British monarchy, the most *gubernamental* of the Republican deputies, Melquíades Álvarez supported Maura's naval program, lavished praise on the army (which he did not wish to see alienated from the nation),

strongly opposed *Solidaridad Catalana*, and, like Azcárate, demanded social reform. A moderate, unlike most Republicans, in religious matters, he accepted the clerical budget and considered separation of Church and State a desirable, but for the moment unattainable, ideal.

Republican members of the *bloque* were divided as to the tactics to be employed against the Maura government. Melquíades Alvarez favored responsible parliamentary opposition. The anticlerical Barcelona lawyer Juan Sol y Ortega (1849-1913), on the other hand, began a campaign of popular agitation against the «corruption» of the Maura regime (Carr 483; Tato). Galdós, who personally esteemed Maura,¹⁵ enthusiastically supported Sol's campaign. Galdós played a leading role in the mass demonstration, boycotted by Azcárate and Melquíades Alvarez, of March 28, 1909, which Sol organized to protest scandals in the administration of the Canal de Isabel II. On April 18, Galdós attended the banquet, from which Melquíades Alvarez excluded himself, of homage to Sol. Pressing the attack on governmental corruption, Galdós and other Republican deputies in late April championed the cause of Juan Macías del Real, the naval auditor arrested after alleging favoritism in the award of contracts to Vickers.¹⁶

Right-wing Republicans defected from the *bloque* in the late summer and fall of 1909 to join the *Conjunción republicano-socialista*, in the formation of which Galdós, as head of the Republican minority in the *Cortes*, played a key role. The principal aim of the *Conjunción* was to secure the downfall of Maura, who was held responsible for the Moroccan campaign and for the repression that followed the *semana trágica*. The Executive Committee of the *Conjunción* was composed of Galdós and Tomás Romero (both representing the Republican minority in the *Cortes*), representatives of the *progresistas* and of the Federal Republicans, the socialists Iglesias and Mora, and, after the fall of Maura, Rodrigo Soriano. (Later, Melquíades Alvarez and Azcárate served on the Executive Committee, but in a personal capacity rather than as party representatives.) Almost immediately, the *Conjunción* lost its *raison d'être*, for in late October Alfonso abruptly and unexpectedly accepted a pro forma offer of resignation from Maura and replaced him with the Liberal Moret. The *Conjunción* continued in existence, however, opposing any possible return of Maura to power and serving as an electoral alliance that linked certain Republican parties and the socialists. The Moret ministry, although favored by moderate Republicans, excluded influential «left-wing» monarchists (Canalejas, Montero Ríos, García Prieto, Romanones), who took their revenge by provoking the fall of Moret in February 1910. Canalejas, the head of the nine-member Democratic minority in the *Cortes*, was appointed prime minister and set about «arranging» elections for May 1910. Moret, embittered, resigned as head of the Liberal party and campaigned for Melquíades Alvarez (Sevilla Andrés 311-12). The *Conjunción*, always distrustful of Canalejas, regarded his opposition to Moret as treachery; in the May election campaigns, the *conjuncionistas* treated Canalejas as the tool of Maura.

Galdós headed the Executive Committee of the *Conjunción*, which in Madrid met alternately in Galdós's and Romero's houses. Galdós accompanied Azcárate when the latter visited Pablo Iglesias to secure the socialist leader's adherence to the *Conjunción*. In early October 1909, Galdós, acting individual-

ly, issued a vigorous manifesto («Al Pueblo Español»), denouncing the war in Morocco and Spanish passivity (Antón del Olmet 118-24; Madariaga 326-29). Galdós continued to cultivate Sol y Ortega: he was the only Republican deputy to visit Sol when the latter, facing probable arrest for alleged complicity in the *semana trágica*, returned from France in mid-October (Tato 501, 610). With Sol, Soriano, and Iglesias, Galdós participated in meetings in Madrid on October 24 and November 7 to seal the alliance of Republican and socialist parties. Significantly, neither meeting was attended by Melquíades Álvarez or by Azcárate, who probably distrusted the radicalism of Galdós's companions; it was not until June 5, 1910 that Melquíades Álvarez publicly embraced Pablo Iglesias.

In early January 1910, Galdós was still on cordial terms with Sol, who was now attempting to resurrect the *Unión Republicana Nacional* as a political force. However, on a visit to Barcelona for the première of *Casandra*, Galdós persuaded Alejandro Lerroux, the head of the Radical Republicans, to enter the *Conjunción*. The price was the inclusion of the Radical Republican Rafael Salillas in the *conjuncionista* slate of candidates for Madrid in the May election. To make room for Salillas (the other candidates were Galdós, the *progresista* Esquerdo, Soriano, the Federal Republican Pi y Arsuaga, and Iglesias), Sol was excluded. Sol, much spited, was elected for Málaga; once in the *Cortes*, he attacked such veteran Republicans as Azcárate and attempted to build up the *Unión Republicana* as an alternative to the *Conjunción*. Galdós was embittered by the disputes that accompanied the selection of candidates for Madrid; his disgust inspired his harsh attack on Republican divisions and *caciquismo* in the interview with *El Bachiller Corchuelo* published in *Por Esos Mundos* in June 1910.¹⁷

Forty Republican deputies (besides the socialist Pablo Iglesias) sat in Canalejas's *Cortes*: the triumph of Republican Nationalists (the newly founded *Unión Federal Nacional Republicana*) and Radical Republicans over Cambó's Lliga greatly increased Republican representation in Catalonia; Liberals and Democrats defected to vote for the victorious *conjuncionista* slate in Madrid. Despite Republican support for Canalejas's anticlerical policies,¹⁸ the *Conjunción* strongly opposed Canalejas throughout 1910 and 1911, both in person (as a puppet controlled by Maura)¹⁹ and for his policies (harsh repression of strikes, Moroccan campaigns, refusal to convoke *Cortes*).

During this period, Galdós's signature appears at the head of all communications of the *Conjunción*; Galdós also participated in meetings organized by the *Conjunción* (Dendle, «*El año político*»). The *Conjunción* was, however, visibly disintegrating. In December 1910, the Radical Republicans abandoned the *Conjunción* when Azcárate and Iglesias refused to accept Lerroux's explanations of the financial scandals in the Barcelona municipality. Republican hostilities were further exacerbated in January 1911, when both the socialists and the *radicales de la Conjunción* (led by Soriano in the pages of *España Nueva*) attacked the Radical Republicans. In the second week of February 1911, Lerroux's Radical Republicans adhered to Sol y Ortega's *Unión Republicana*. Almost simultaneously, the *U. F. N. R.* (represented by Luis and José de Zulueta) was admitted to the *Conjunción*. Sol thereupon protested the presence of Catalanists in the *Conjunción*; Galdós took Sol's words as a

personal attack on his patriotism and issued an energetic protest (Dendle, «Sol» 444-46). Galdós's political movement to the right became manifest in the brief but laudatory prologue that he wrote in April 1911 for the edition of Melquíades Alvarez's parliamentary speeches.²⁰

The *Partido Reformista* and the Rapprochement with the Monarchy

The *Conjunción* campaigned against Canalejas throughout the fall of 1911; however, as early as September there were rumors of strong differences of opinion within the Executive Committee. In December 1911 and early January 1912, the *Conjunción*, with other left-wing organizations, demanded revisions of the death penalty for participants in the Cullera incident (see Dendle, «El año político» 95-96). Alfonso's commutation of the death sentences brought the King high praise in Republican circles. In the same month, fears (ungrounded) of a return to power of Maura caused the *Conjunción* to declare its support of Canalejas, as preferable to the Conservative leader.

Not only were Republicans praising Alfonso; loyalties within the *Conjunción* were shifting. On January 30, 1912, Dr. Esquerdo died; the *progresistas* thereupon offered their allegiance to Melquíades Alvarez. Early in the year also, the U. F. N. R., disappointed at the failure of the *Conjunción* to support the projected *ley de Mancomunidades*, abandoned the *Conjunción*. Galdós («crítico implacable de la dispersión liberal y republicana» [García Venero 241] now belonged to the group of moderate Republicans that formed around Melquíades Alvarez and Azcárate. On April 7, 1912, Melquíades Alvarez announced the formation of the *partido reformista*, a non-revolutionary grouping of right-wing Republicans offering political realism and social progress: «Independencia y soberanía del Poder; secularización del Estado, no de la sociedad; plan total de cultura y de obras públicas y absoluta saturación social de toda la obra política» (García Venero 245). Among the supporters of the new party were Azcárate, the two Zuluetas (Melquíades Alvarez now accepted regional autonomy), Tomás Romero, and Galdós, who sent an enthusiastic letter of adhesion to be read at the inauguration of the *partido reformista*.²¹

By the fall of 1912, Spanish political vendettas were greatly muted. Canalejas and Maura discussed without acrimony the government's handling of the railroad strike; Melquíades Alvarez and Canalejas showed signs of willingness to collaborate (Sevilla Andrés 442). Old wounds were reopened, however, by the assassination of Canalejas in early November. Alfonso summoned Romanones to power; Maura, spited, six weeks later abruptly resigned as deputy and as head of the Conservative Party. The *conjuncionistas'* aversion to Maura, the principal unifying factor in the alliance, was as strong as ever. The manifesto of the *Conjunción* of January 13, 1913 all but accused Maura of rebellion against the monarchy. Melquíades Alvarez's speeches of early 1913 offered fulsome praise of Alfonso's actions.

As certain Republicans drew closer to the monarchy, Alfonso began an assiduous courtship of Republicans of moderate tendencies. Already in 1912, the King had invited the *reformista* deputy José de Zulueta to sit at his right

hand at the inauguration of the Ruidecans dam. On January 14, 1913, three prominent Republicans—Azcárate, Cossío, and Cajal—were received by Alfonso.²² Azcárate, deeply touched by the cordial reception and by Alfonso's interest in the work of the Instituto de Reformas Sociales, declared to journalists that the «obstáculos tradicionales» had now disappeared. Romanones apparently hoped at this time that Azcárate would serve as President of the *Congreso*. In February, at the *reformista* banquet to commemorate the Republic of 1873, Melquíades Alvarez's approval of Azcárate's visit to the King brought applause. In April, Azcárate and Labra expressed their sympathy after an anarchist's attempt on Alfonso's life. In May, Azcárate was introduced by Alfonso to President Poincaré.

In June 1913, discussion of the projected *ley de Mancomunidades* divided the Liberals. In the crisis (the *Cortes* lasted only from May 26 to June 12), Romanones, at the instigation of Alfonso, consulted Melquíades Alvarez and Azcárate, who agreed conditionally to support the government (and thus the monarchy). The *reformistas* were thereupon expelled from the *Conjunción*, the majority of whose members refused to accept the *reformista* collaboration with the monarchy (June 12); two days earlier, the four *reformista* deputies on the Executive Committee of the *Conjunción*—Galdós, Laureano Miró, Luis de Zulueta, and Azcárate—had resigned. Rodrigo Soriano and Pablo Iglesias shortly accused Melquíades Alvarez of treachery for his *evolución* toward the monarchy.²³

The day before the *Cortes* reopened in October, García Prieto, heading a group of dissident Liberals and Democrats, withdrew his support from Romanones. Alfonso, rather than calling on a Liberal to form a ministry, as García Prieto requested, asked Dato to head a Conservative ministry. In the same month, a rump of the *progresistas*, upset by Melquíades Alvarez's role of *monárquico condicional*, abandoned the *partido reformista*. The *reformista* banquet held in the Hotel Palace on October 23 demonstrated the great attraction that the party had for Spanish intellectuals: Ortega y Gasset (who announced the founding of the *Liga de Educación Pública*), Pedro Salinas, Villalobos, Américo Castro, Manuel Azaña, and Federico de Onís were among those attending; Galdós sent a letter of support. To delirious applause, Melquíades Alvarez called for a socially progressive, non-Marxist governmental party and for Spanish adherence to the Anglo-French *entente* (Soldevilla, 1913 334).

The next major Republican to meet Alfonso was Galdós. According to García Venero, Alfonso wished to speak with Melquíades Alvarez (273-74). To this end, the King contributed ten thousand pesetas to the proposed national homage to Galdós and arranged for Galdós to be presented to the royal family at the benefit performance of *Celia en los infiernos* on January 7, 1914. The occasion was one of political significance, for it temporarily sealed the rapprochement of the *reformistas* with the monarchy. Romanones (the head of the Liberals), Dato (the Conservative prime minister), Sánchez Guerra (the Minister of the Interior), and the *reformista* Azcárate were among those present. Melquíades Alvarez, who had been invited, did not attend. (He finally met with the King in December 1915; by 1917, the *reformistas* were again a Republican party.)

Perhaps Galdós's last significant political action was his refusal, in March 1914, of Romanones's proffered bribe of a life-senatorship (anathema to the *reformistas*, who advocated reform of the Senate);²⁴ rejecting Romanones's proposal, Galdós was elected *reformista* deputy for Las Palmas, one of the eleven *reformista* members of Dato's *Cortes*. During the First World War, the *reformistas* supported a neutrality oriented toward the Allies. In 1917, Galdós, now blind and too old for an active political role, was named honorary president of the *Liga antigermanófila*, which counted among its members most of Spain's leading intellectuals and *reformistas*.

Research into Galdós's political activities is still incomplete; the forthcoming publication of his political correspondence by Veronica Dean Thacker should resolve many still unanswered questions. Consideration of Galdós's role in the political context of the period 1907 to 1914 provides no evidence for Berkowitz's claim that Galdós was manipulated, to his detriment, by others. Rather, Berkowitz's account, apart from its inaccuracies and omissions, is marred by a serious bias in favor of the Liberal party and its politicians. Galdós, an ardent anticlerical, became a Republican in early 1907, at a time when the Liberal party had proved incapable of enacting anticlerical legislation and was rent by internecine disputes. Galdós used the campaign against the *Ley del terrorismo* to propagate his anticlerical ideas; he was, for the period 1907 to 1909, associated with the anticlerical politicians Rodrigo Soriano and Juan Sol y Ortega. Unlike moderate Republicans, Galdós supported Sol's campaign to provoke the fall of Maura by mass agitation. In late 1909, he played a prominent part in the formation of the *Conjunción*; he was the go-between in securing the adherence of various Republican groupings and of the socialists. Disgusted with the negotiations that preceded the elections of May 1910, Galdós turned against Sol. He now allied himself with the non-revolutionary, intellectual Republicans, Melquíades Alvarez and Gumerindo de Azcárate, and accompanied them in the formation of the *partido reformista* and in their resignation from the *Conjunción*. As a *reformista*, Galdós lent his prestige to a party that embodied the principles which he had long defended—the *partido reformista* was Anglophile,²⁵ socially progressive, willing to take power by constitutional means, and shared with the socialists a reputation for incorruptibility—and which seemingly offered, in late 1913, a responsible alternative to the heavily fragmented Liberal and Conservative parties.

The *partido reformista* was above all a party of intellectuals. It linked the liberal thinkers of the final third of the nineteenth century (Galdós, Azcárate, José de Zulueta) with the young reformers of the second decade of the twentieth century (Ortega y Gasset, Maeztu, Pérez de Ayala, and the other members of the *Liga de Educación Pública*.) The *reformistas* were too intellectual in their attitude to achieve power during the political and social turmoil prevalent in Spain during the First World War, although at one moment, with the *Asamblea de Parlamentarios* in Barcelona in 1917, Melquíades Alvarez, Lerroux, and Cambó were joined in a seemingly powerful alliance of *reformistas*, Republicans, socialists, and regionalists. *Reformistas*

formed part of García Prieto's cabinet of December 1922; Melquíades Alvarez was President of the Congress at the time of Primo de Rivera's coup. Later, of course, *reformistas* pursued individual political paths: Azaña became president of the Second Republic, and Melquíades Alvarez, the lawyer for José Antonio Primo de Rivera, was executed in the *Cárcel Modelo*—opposite which Galdós once lived—in August 1936.

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NOTES

¹ Berkowitz's approach has been challenged, although only in general terms, by Smith (187) and by Dendle («*El año político*» 87-88, 98). Hinterhäuser, obviously influenced by Berkowitz, refers to the Galdós of the early twentieth century as suffering from «un sentimiento típicamente senil» (215-16).

² For a brief summary of Galdós's Republicanism, see Dendle, *Galdós* 145-52; for his relations with Sol y Ortega, see Dendle, «Sol»; for an indication of the impact of Galdós's Republicanism on his contemporaries, see the listing of his political activities by Soldevilla (Dendle, «*El año político*»). For his alleged pessimism in 1912, see Blanquat.

³ Cf. Berkowitz's acceptance at face value of the opinions of Galdós's political opponents, the *maurista* Azorín (406-07) and Romanones (404-05).

⁴ For a succinct discussion of European liberalism of the period, see Hayes 46-87. Hayes claims that «Republicanism was the supreme Iberian expression of sectarian Liberalism» (70). Note also that Spain's leading Republican journal was named *El Liberal*.

⁵ For a defense of Alfonso XIII's role, see Seco Serrano 63-84. For an opposing view, see Artola 1: 349-65.

⁶ See Fernández Almagro 35. The sacking by army officers of two Barcelona newspaper offices in late 1905 and the refusal by the military to punish the offenders was a manifest sign of military power in political matters.

⁷ Galdós had conducted an anticlerical campaign since the turn of the century: *Electra* had served as a rallying cry to the anticlericals of 1901; the *Episodios nacionales* of the fourth series (1902-07) are dominated by the religious question; in *La de los tristes destinos*, written between January and May 1907, Galdós uses the religious question as the test of the commitment of the revolutionaries of 1868 to fundamental change.

⁸ Fernando Lozano was Spain's leading freethinker, the founder of the journal *Las Dominicales* (1885), and later organizer of the International Congress of Free Thought held in Madrid. Luis Morote (1862-1913), a journalist, friend of Canalejas, and Republican deputy for Madrid since 1905, was the author of the rabidly anticlerical *Los frailes en España* (1904). Rodrigo Soriano (1868-1944), Republican deputy since 1901 and founder of the Republican newspaper *España Nueva* in 1906, had been prominently involved in the anticlerical campaigns of 1901. Paul Smith establishes that Soriano had been a friend of Galdós since at least 1895 (193); Soriano's long-standing friendship with Galdós makes Berkowitz's unsupported assertion that Galdós's friends were dismayed by his Republicanism all the more curious.

⁹ The text of Galdós's manifesto is printed in Antón del Olmet 114-18 and in Madariaga 316-18.

¹⁰ «Ingreso en la falange republicana, reservándome la independencia en todo lo que no sea incompatible con las ideas esenciales de la forma de Gobierno que defendemos» (Antón del Olmet 117).

¹¹ The campaign, supported by the right-wing and moderate Republicans Sol y Ortega, Azcárate, and Melquíades Alvarez, by the Democrat Canalejas, and by the Liberal Moret, was the first stage in the formation of the *bloque de las izquierdas* proposed by Melquíades Alvarez a year earlier.

¹² Galdós's praise of Charles III's regalism recalls Melquíades Alvarez's insistence that the form of government is accidental. The Barcelona meeting was strongly anticlerical. Participants attended a performance of *Electra*; Sol y Ortega, the leading speaker, called for separation of Church and State.

¹³ For a summary of Moret's speech and of reactions to it, see Soldevilla, 1908 406-25.

¹⁴ «[Galdós] sentía, además, profunda aversión hacia los liberales por el estilo de Romanones y Canalejas, y grande estimación íntima hacia Maura, que fue su abogado providencial en asuntos económicos» (198). Although García Venero's remark is given in passing and is unsupported, I have little doubt as to its accuracy.

¹⁵ Cf. Galdós's praise of Maura to Antón del Olmet and García Carrarra: «me parece un hombre de gran talento, y sobre todo, un hombre de indiscutible sinceridad. Acaso sea de los hombres más sinceros de la política española» (Antón del Olmet 109-10).

¹⁶ The campaign backfired when Morote—who had with Galdós, Melquíades Alvarez, and four other Republican deputies petitioned for a special investigatory commission—exonerated the government in a sensational speech on April 26. Republicans attacked Morote with such hostility for his «betrayal» that he renounced his seat for Madrid and his position as editor of *El Heraldo*. At the end of April 1910, Morote joined the monarchists—the first significant Republican defection—and was forthwith elected deputy for Las Palmas.

¹⁷ Extracts from this article are in Soldevilla, 1910 251-52. Galdós was still hostile to Sol y Ortega at the time of his interview with Antón del Olmet and García Carrarra in 1912.

¹⁸ Note the march by Galdós, Azcárate, Lerroix, Melquíades Alvarez, and other Republican politicians in favor of Canalejas's proposed anticlerical measures on July 3, 1910.

¹⁹ For example, Melquíades Alvarez claimed, to delirious applause, at a meeting of the *Conjunción* on June 5, 1910: «La Monarquía echa a Moret; Maura es quien manda, y Canalejas quien gobierna» (Soldevilla, 1910 211-14).

²⁰ The prologue, which is not listed by Shoemaker, appears in Melquíades Alvarez (xvii) and reads as follows:

Palabras de Galdós

En la oratoria política, así ante el Parlamento como ante las multitudes, no hallaréis quien iguale a Melquíades Alvarez. En él se compendian todas las dotes físicas y espirituales que llevan al ánimo del oyente la emoción y la persuasión, envueltas la una en la otra y fundidas en un solo efecto maravilloso. Su pensamiento vívil razona con dialéctica inflexible; su aliento inflama la idea; su voz vibrante, ayudada del gesto estatuario, lanza la palabra como una exhalación fulmínea, hacia el corazón y la mente del auditorio.

Melquíades es la oratoria misma, hijo predilecto de la Musa Polimnia, en quien los antiguos personificaron la Elocuencia y la Pantomima, entendiendo ésta en el sentido helénico, o sea el arte de las actitudes, auxiliares del arte de la palabra, y ésta órgano eficaz del pensamiento.

En los monumentales discursos que aquí se imprimen, ha subido el gran tribuno a las más altas cimas del genio oratorio.

Si este noble hijo de Asturias pertenece a España como lumbraera del Foro y como propagandista republicano, sus ardientes luchas en defensa de la supremacía del Poder Civil y de los fueros de la Humanidad, le dan por patria el mundo entero.

Madrid 14 de Abril de 1911

B. Pérez Galdós

²¹ The text of Galdós's letter is in Blanquat 144. Blanquat correctly describes Lerroix's opposition to the new party; her claim that Galdós represented—she quotes Lerroix—a «campo neutral» is incorrect.

²² The Republican visit to the Palace was of considerable symbolic importance. Cf. Unamuno's interview with Alfonso, described by García Martí 122-25.

²³ For the campaign by the *Conjunción* against Melquíades Alvarez in Asturias, see Soldevilla, 1913 334.

²⁴ See Berkowitz 404-05, who takes at face value Romanones's manifestly interested offer. In 1916, Romanones offered Azcárate a life-senatorship, which Azcárate likewise refused.

²⁵ For Trend, the *reformistas* were not only Anglophile but inspired by the British parliamentary reform of 1911 (169-91).

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