51
Alarcón, Act I, 936-41.
52
«To explain sin he must introduce another faculty besides desire or reason to initiate this act, something which has the power to say no to the best advice of reason and thus to confound the proper order between reason and desire. He must introduce the will»
(Stone 262-63).
53
Modern theologians can be even blunter and more explicit. «Freedom is not something won by our own will. It is not an expression of our own being nor a
constitutive element in human nature,»
and therefore «We are free because we have been freed. Freedom has been acquired. It has been given»
(Ellul 103 and 104).
54
«The distinction between freedom of agency and freedom of will applies to this problem. For the bondage of the will to sin is an inability of the will to do what it wills, not an inability of the will to will. The will may be unfree to do what it wills, but it is still free to will»
(Stone 264). Frankfurt, also, writes: «When we ask whether a person's will is free we are not asking whether he is in a position to translate his first-order desires into actions»
(90).
55
I refer to the edition by Avalle-Arce (Madrid: Castalia, 1969). Further references will occur in the text.
56
I have previously dealt with this problematic development in Marriage of Convenience (1993), but it can be seen in comments such as Grieve's «he is generally considered to be a male author sympathetic to the plight of women»
(88); Combet's «l'héroïne cervantine est toujours disponible por l'action ou la volonté»
(55), and much of the work of El Saffar and her
followers.
57
See Green, Halka, and Murillo 1928.
58
For a discussion of «ugly»
women in Don Quijote see Fernández de Cano y Martín.
59
Quotes from Don Quijote are taken from the edition of Murillo.
60
Paré 46. Just as Paré compares the joven velluda to an «oso,»
Redondo argues that the oso in Toboso provides another example of the carnivalesque inversion in Cervantes's work (1617). See also Huet 1923.